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INTRODUCTION 
Under the plain language of the parties' Agreement, their agreement to arbitrate is 
limited in scope. Specifically, the only reasonable and harmonious interpretation of the 
Agreement's arbitration provision is that a forensic accountant is required to resolve any 
disputes regarding the amounts contained in Appellee's (the "USS Parties") CAMS Data 
- i.e the total amount of outstanding invoices in USS's electronic records system. The 
Agreement lacks any express provision requiring that the parties' arbitrate other disputes. 
However, Appellants' (the "Mariposa Franchisees") Complaint does not request that the 
Court resolve any dispute regarding CAMS Data. Instead, the Complaint requests that 
the Court interpret the scope of the Agreement's indemnification provision and the 
Mariposa's liability under that provision. As a result, the district court erred in broadly 
construing the arbitration provision and compelling the Mariposa Franchisees into 
arbitration. In addition, because the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act required the district 
court to stay the action pending arbitration, the district court erred in dismissing the 
Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHILE THE USS PARTIES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE MARIPOSA 
FRANCHISEES HAVE RAISED CAUSES OF ACTION IN THEIR COMPLAINT 
CONCERNING LIABILITY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES' 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN THAT 
AGREEMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE ARBITRATION OF THOSE ISSUES. 
Arbitration is "a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^10* 40 P.3d 599. In this case, the 
USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees entered into a settlement agreement that 
addressed several issues, including (i) Mariposa Franchisees' indemnification of the USS 
Parties, (ii) the parties' proprietary materials and information, (iii) future shipments and 
billings between the parties, (iv) representations and warranties by the parties, and (v) a 
1 
covenant that Mariposa Franchisees would "not to disparage" or defame the USS Parties, 
among other things. See Agreement (R. 21-54). In addition, the settlement agreement 
required the Mariposa Franchisees to pay certain amounts to the USS Parties. Id The 
payment provisions included a section on "Settlement Payment" where the Mariposa 
Franchisees agreed to pay a lump sum to the USS Parties, which they did. (Agreement at 
Tf4; R.26). The agreement contained a "Payment for Freight Services" where the 
Mariposa Franchisees agreed to reimburse USS for freight shipments, which they did. 
(Agreement at ^jl; R. 22). And it contained an "Indemnification" provision where the 
Mariposa Franchisees agreed to indemnify the USS Parties for any amounts paid to DHL 
Express (USA), Inc. for services provided to the franchisees and their customers. 
(Agreement at ^[3; R. 25). 
The agreement also required the parties to arbitrate disputes concerning certain 
"payments" and "amounts" and it specified that the arbitrator must be "one forensic 
accountant," who will review documentation and calculate invoices. (Agreement at 
1Jl(c); R. 24). The agreement is silent regarding the forum for resolving all other 
disputes. However, the parties' intent that all other disputes be resolved through a court 
action, rather than arbitration, is evidenced in the provision of the Agreement dealing 
with defaults. (Agreement at 1fl[5-6; R- 28). Under that provision, if the Mariposa 
Franchisees defaulted under the Agreement, the USS Parties were required to file 
Confessions of Judgment and a Stipulated Judgment in the district court. Id The 
Mariposa Franchisees were entitled to "oppose entry of the judgment on the grounds that 
no Default occurred." IdL As a result, given that the Agreement expressly requires that 
the district court determine whether a default occurred and the conspicuous absence of 
any provision requiring that other disputes be subject to arbitration, the Agreement must 
be interpreted as not requiring every dispute to be resolved through arbitration. 
In their brief, the USS Parties have acknowledged that "[t]he heart of the dispute 
between the parties is whether the Mariposa [Franchisees are] obligated to indemnify the 
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USS Parties for the amounts the USS Parties had to pay to DHL for unpaid DHL 
shipments and, if so, what amount they owe." (Brief of Appellees at 21) (emphasis 
added). And, indeed, the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint involved the scope and 
application of the indemnification provision in the settlement agreement, and the liability, 
if any, of the franchisees under that provision. (R. 1-130). Specifically, the Mariposa 
Franchisees maintain that they are not obligated to indemnify the USS Parties under the 
circumstances, and they have requested relief in the form of declaratory judgment and an 
injunction. Id. Asa result, the Complaint does not raise claims that may be reconciled 
by a forensic accountant. 
Notwithstanding, the USS Parties first purport to rely on the plain language of the 
Agreement to claim that the scope and liability issues raised by the Complaint are subject 
to arbitration. And second, they claim that the issues in the Complaint concerning scope 
and liability actually qualify as disputes concerning amounts owing under the 
indemnification provision. Both of the USS Parties' claims are wrong under the plain 
language of the Agreement and the Complaint. 
A. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT 
SUPPORT ARBITRATION. 
The USS Parties' interpretation of the scope of the Agreement's arbitration 
provision is overly broad and ignores the basic cannons of contract interpretation. In 
advancing their interpretation, USS Parties rely heavily on Utah's presumption in favor 
of arbitration. However, this presumption does not apply to interpreting the existence or 
scope of the agreement to arbitrate itself. See McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Utah, 980 P.2d 694, 697, f l l (Utah App. 1999) ("Parties are required to arbitrate only 
those disputes they have agreed to submit to arbitration ... [t]hus, a court deciding a 
motion to compel arbitration must first determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, 
and if so, whether the agreement encompasses the claims asserted"). In this case, the 
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USS Parties have not claimed there is any ambiguity or any other circumstances under 
which the presumption would be invoked. As a result, the Court must interpret the 
contract "by examining the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, 
giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." G.G.A., Inc. 
v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989). The contract should be interpreted so 
as to "harmonize all of its terms and provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect 
if possible." Id. Each contract provision must be considered "in relation to all of the 
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." McEwan v. Mountain 
Land Support Corp., 2005 UT App 240,1f 16, 116 P. 3d 955 (Utah App. 2005). 
With respect to their first argument, the USS Parties begin with the provision 
addressing "Payment for Freight Services," which states that "any dispute regarding the 
Freight Payments" will be "resolved exclusively by binding arbitration." (Agreement at 
1f 1(c); R. 24; Brief of Appellees at 23 n.14). A liberal interpretation of that provision may 
support the position that any dispute regarding payments for freight services under 
Section 1 of the Agreement must be submitted to a forensic accountant for arbitration, 
whether the dispute involves liability for freight services or the amount due for freight 
services. However, an interpretation of the arbitration provision with respect to freight 
services under Section 1 of the Agreement does not end the analysis in this dispute 
because the Mariposa Franchisees' claims for relief relate to liability under the 
indemnification provision of Section 3 of the Agreement. The question in this case is 
whether the parties bargained for arbitration as a method of resolving disagreements 
concerning interpretation of and liability under the separate indemnification provision of 
Paragraph 3, as opposed to a dispute under the freight services provision of Paragraph 1. 
As a result, USS has acknowledged that an interpretation of the indemnification 
and arbitration provision contained in Paragraph 3 of the Agreement is determinative of 
the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. (Appellee Brief at 23). Under the 
indemnification provision of the Agreement, the Mariposa Franchisees were to indemnify 
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the USS Parties for any amounts they were required to pay to DHL on behalf of the 
Mariposa Franchisees in connection with a separate lawsuit between the USS Parties and 
DHL (the "DHL lawsuit"). Because the Mariposa Franchisees were not involved in the 
DHL lawsuit, the USS Parties were required to keep the Mariposa Franchisees apprised 
of developments in the matter and to provide information to the franchisees before 
reaching any resolution with DHL that may directly affect the franchisees. Specifically, 
the settlement agreement between the Mariposa Franchisees and the USS Parties stated 
that if the USS Parties "desire[d] to resolve" the separate DHL lawsuit through 
settlement, the USS Parties were required to give the Mariposa Franchisees access to 
CAMS Data, information and invoices relevant to franchisees' financial obligations 
under the indemnification provision. (R. 25; Agreement at IP-a).1 The Mariposa 
Franchisees then would have the opportunity to disagree with the purported amounts in 
the CAMS Data, but they would not be allowed to interfere in the DHL lawsuit. Id. The 
settlement agreement also stated that "any dispute" between the Mariposa Franchisees 
and the USS Parties concerning the "amounts" set forth in the CAMS Data and invoices 
shall be resolved using the procedures set forth in the "Payment for Freight Services" 
provision. Id 
1
 The relevant portion of this provision states that: 
The parties agree that, if DHL and the USS parties desire to resolve the DHL 
Lawsuit through a settlement, the USS Parties shall provide the Mariposa 
Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data (of the same type and nature set 
forth in Paragraph 1 above) necessary to show the DHL Services provided to 
the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers. If the Mariposa Franchisees 
do not agree with the amount identified by the USS Parties, the USS Parties 
shall nevertheless have the right to proceed with settlement and any dispute 
between the USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these 
amounts shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure 
set forth in Paragraph l.c above. 
(R. 25; Agreement at |3.a) (emphasis added). 
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In their brief, the USS Parties repeatedly emphasize the phrase "any dispute", as 
though that phrase requires the parties to resolve "all disputes" in arbitration. See e.g. 
Brief of Appellees at 23, 24, 26, 31 (emphasis in original). However, the plain language 
of the agreement does not support that interpretation. Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. 
Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, [^12, 40 P.3d 599. The arbitration provision in the 
"Payment for Freight Services" section, read together with the indemnification provision, 
is limited in scope. It unambiguously supports the interpretation that if the Mariposa 
Franchisees raise a dispute concerning the amounts in the CAMS Data, those disputes 
must be submitted to a forensic accountant in arbitration. It does not require the parties 
to arbitrate to any dispute involving issues of liability under the indemnification provision 
or interpretation of that provision. 
Specifically, USS's interpretation ignores the first sentence of Paragraph 3(a), 
which states that USS must provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to "the CAMS 
Data (of the same type and nature set forth in Paragraph 1 above)." (Agreement at p . a ; 
R. 25). Paragraph 1(a) of the Agreement defines CAMS Data as "copies of the corporate 
payment screen and open franchise invoices for their respective franchises, showing the' 
amounts USS believes each Mariposa Franchisee owes." (Agreement at fl.a; R. 
22)(emphasis added). Indeed, in its brief, USS has acknowledged that the CAMS Data 
refers to an amount, stating that "[ajfter disclosure of the CAMS Data, the Mariposa 
Franchisees were given time to review that data and indicate whether they disputed the 
amounts shown in the CAMS Data." (Appellee Brief at 9). Given the immediate 
proximity of the sentence requiring that the Mariposa Franchisees be provided with the 
CAMS Data amount to the sentence referring to the Mariposa Franchisees disagreeing 
with the "amount identified by the USS Parties" and requiring arbitration of any disputes 
"concerning these amounts," the only harmonious and reasonable interpretation of the 
Agreement is that the parties only agreed to submit any dispute regarding the CAMS 
Data amount to arbitration. 
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In addition, USS's interpretation renders Paragraph 3.a. redundant and/or 
meaningless. Paragraph 3.a contains two separate and distinct invocations of arbitration. 
First, "[i]f the Mariposa Franchisees do not agree with the amount identified by the USS 
Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right to proceed with settlement and 
any dispute between the USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these 
amounts shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in 
Paragraph l.c above." (Agreement at |3.a; R. 25). Second, "if the USS Parties are 
determined to owe DHL, through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the 
Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute between the USS Parties and 
the Mariposa Franchisees concerning such amounts shall be resolve [sic] in accordance 
with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph l.c above." Id. Under USS's 
interpretation, which requires that all disputes be arbitrated, this repeated reference to the 
arbitration procedure would redundant and meaningless. Indeed, the Paragraph 3.a would 
be rendered meaningless in almost its entirety. Under USS's interpretation, Paragraph 
3.a. would stand for the simple proposition that all disputes regarding the indemnification 
amounts would be subject to arbitration. All of the verbiage defining the circumstances 
under which the parties would follow the arbitration procedures would be meaningless. 
As a result, the only reasonable and harmonious interpretation of Paragraph 3.a., which 
gives meaning to all of its terms, is that the parties' intended that the arbitration 
procedures only apply to specific well-defined disputes involving the CAMS Data 
amounts. 
Furthermore, USS's interpretation renders part of Paragraph l(c)(i), which defines 
the role of arbitrator, meaningless. Under Paragraph l(c)(i), "the parties shall submit the 
matter to binding arbitration before one forensic accountant, who shall review the parties' 
documentation and establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on any disputed invoices." 
(Agreement at fl.c; R. 24) (emphasis added). If the parties intended that the arbitrator 
decide legal issues, such as whether the indemnification provision had been triggered and 
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the proportionate amount of each Mariposa Franchisees' liability, the more limited 
definition of the arbitrator's role contained in Paragraph l.c.i would be meaningless. 
Instead, the harmonious and reasonable interpretation of Paragraphs 3(a) and 1(c) is that 
the forensic accountant would review the CAMS Data, which included all "open 
franchise invoices," and determine the amount due "on any disputed invoices." 
(Agreement at ffljl.a, l.c; R. 22, 24) (emphasis added).2 Such an interpretation also 
makes more sense from a practical standpoint - a forensic accountant is more qualified 
and would be more efficient at resolving disputed invoices than a judge or jury. On the 
other hand, a judge would be more qualified to make legal determinations regarding 
whether the indemnification provision had been triggered or the pro rata amount of each 
Mariposa franchisees' indemnification obligation. 
In this case, as admitted by both the parties, the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint 
does not request that the district court resolve a dispute over the CAMS Data amounts. 
Rather it seeks declaratory judgment as to whether the Mariposa Franchisees are 
obligated under the circumstances to indemnify the USS Parties at all. The Complaint 
states that the Mariposa Franchisees made efforts to obtain information relating to the 
2
 Furthermore, USS's interpretation creates a contradictory timeline within the Settlement 
Agreement. Pursuant to Paragraph 3.a, if Mariposa Franchisees disagreed with the 
amounts "identified by the USS Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right 
to proceed with settlement and any dispute ... concerning these amounts shall be 
resolved" through arbitration. (Paragraph Tf3.a). Therefore, according to this provision, 
the disputed amount is identified by USS prior to entering into a settlement with DHL. 
However, the indemnification amount in Paragraph 3 is the amount that "USS [is] 
determined to owe DHL through judgment or settlement for DHL services." (Paragraph 
TJ3). In other words, the indemnification amount is not determined until after the 
settlement with DHL is finalized. As a result, USS's interpretation is inherently 
contradictory because USS would be required to provide the Mariposa Franchisees with 
the amount they were determined to owe DHL through settlement before such a 
settlement had even taken place. Instead, the harmonious reading is that the amount 
referred to is the CAMS Data, which already existed prior to any settlement between USS 
and DHL. 
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resolution of the DHL lawsuit and the USS Parties' liability to DHL upon resolution of 
that lawsuit. (Complaint at 1H62-63, 71, 79-80; R. 1-130). The Mariposa Franchisees 
therefore filed the lawsuit to resolve those liability issues and they have asserted causes 
of action for interpretation and proper enforcement of the Agreement. (Complaint at 
H76-122; R. 1-130). 
The Mariposa Franchisees' course of action was proper. The settlement 
agreement contemplates arbitration with a forensic accountant only when invoices and 
CAM Data are in dispute; it is otherwise silent as to any challenge concerning liability or 
interpretation of the indemnification provision. An accountant may be uniquely situated 
to resolve disputes concerning amounts and invoices quickly and efficiently, but lacks the 
training and qualification to resolve questions of liability and interpretation. In that 
instance, the district court should resolve the liability issues and then, once they are 
resolved, order the parties to arbitrate any dispute concerning amounts.3 
While the USS Parties claim that such a procedure "is unreasonable and would 
result in nonsensical outcomes" (Brief of Appellees at 28), the procedure is supported by 
the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. The Act allows a district court to sever claims in a 
civil action and to retain and resolve those claims that are not covered by an enforceable 
arbitration agreement. The court is required to refer the remaining claims to arbitration. 
See Utah Code § 78B-11-108(7). Indeed, by only having the arbitration procedure 
applicable to the specific circumstances when a judgment had been entered against USS 
or prior to USS entering into a settlement with DHL, the parties were limiting the 
arbitration to circumstances where legal proceedings were unnecessary. Specifically, if a 
judgment had been entered against USS, liability under the indemnification provision 
would not be an issue - only the amount of each Mariposa Franchisees' liability. 
Similarly, if the USS Parties kept the Mariposa Franchisees informed of settlement 
3
 The Complaint in this case did not ask the district court to decide amounts. Moreover, 
it is not unusual for issues of liability and damages to be bifurcated. 
Q 
negotiations with DHL and resolved any dispute regarding CAMS Amounts prior to 
entering into a settlement; the probability of later litigation regarding liability under the 
indemnification provision would be slim. 
B. THE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AS SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT ARE NOT 
ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THEY DO NOT INVOLVE A DISPUTE OVER THE 
CAMS DATA AMOUNTS. 
In apparent recognition of the limited scope of the arbitration provision, the USS 
Parties next claim that the scope and liability issues set forth in the Complaint qualify as 
disputes concerning the CAMS Data amounts. They claim that the Complaint ultimately 
comes down to whether the Mariposa Franchisees owe anything at all. Thus, the claims 
should be arbitrated under the provision concerning disputes of CAM Data amounts. 
(Appellees' Brief at 31-32). The USS Parties' characterization is an oversimplification of 
the matter. As stated above, the Complaint raises claims dealing with liability and the 
scope of the indemnification provision. It does not dispute the amount of the payment as 
reflected in the CAMS Data under the indemnification provision. 
While liability issues and damages issues often go together, they are not one in the 
same. Liability issues can and may be resolved separately from damages/amounts issues. 
Indeed, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act allows for proceedings in a civil case to be 
4
 USS's claim that only an arbitrator can decide if contingent circumstances for 
arbitration have been met is not applicable here. As admitted by USS, the "facts are not 
in dispute" in this case. (Appellee Brief at 17). It is undisputed that there is no dispute 
concerning liability or the amount payable for freight under Paragraph l.a. It is 
undisputed that no judgment was entered against USS in the DHL Lawsuit, and that USS 
and DHL settled the case. Id at 13. And USS has admitted that "falfter entering into the 
DHL Agreement, the USS Parties informed the Mariposa Franchisees of that agreement 
by letter." Id (emphasis added). "In that letter, the USS parties ... provided the 
Mariposa Franchisees with the CAMS Data for each of their respective franchises." IcL at 
13-14. Therefore it is undisputed that USS did not provide the Mariposa Franchisees 
with the CAMS Data until well after it has settled with DHL. As a result, there are no 
factual disputes for the arbitrator to decide regarding the occurrence of contingent 
circumstances requiring arbitration. 
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severed to accommodate arbitration for portions of the case. Utah Code § 78B-11-
108(7). Moreover, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit claims in a civil case to be 
severed and bifurcated. See e,g. Utah R. Civ. P. 42(b). In this case, the final amount 
owed to the USS Parties may well turn on "the accuracy of the CAMS Data" (Brief of 
Appellees at 31), but the initial questions concerning liability and the scope of the 
indemnification provision may or may not lead to the issue of whether the CAMS Data 
amounts are accurate. Once the initial issues are resolved, the court then may refer any 
dispute concerning the amounts to arbitration. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE NONE OF 
THE CLAIMS IN THE COMPLAINT ARE SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION 
PROVISION. 
The district court erred when it broadly construed the arbitration provision in the 
settlement agreement to apply to the claims in the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint. Its 
interpretation of the limited arbitration provision invites the absurd result of an 
accountant being required to address issues of liability and contract interpretation. 
Moreover, the district court's misapplication of the arbitration provision does not further 
the policy in favor of arbitration. Utah courts favor arbitration but they do so only when 
the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute. If no enforceable agreement to arbitrate 
exists, the court "may not" compel arbitration. Utah Code § 78B-11-108(3). As 
explained above, the Complaint was limited to liability issues under the indemnification 
provision. These issues were outside the scope of the arbitration provision in the 
settlement agreement and no other enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists to support the 
district court's order. The Mariposa Franchisees therefore respectfully ask this Court to 
reverse the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the Complaint. 
11 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE 
DISMISSAL WAS NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER THE UTAH ARBITRATION ACT. 
The USS Parties claim that the Mariposa Franchisees have not challenged the 
district court's order on appeal dismissing the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint. (Brief 
of Appellees at 1 n.2, 3-4 n.3). However, not only have the Mariposa Franchisees raised 
that issue on appeal, but the issue itself is inextricably intertwined with the Mariposa 
Franchisees' other arguments on appeal. Specifically, the Mariposa Franchisees have 
argued that the claims for relief set forth in the Complaint are not subject to the 
arbitration provision of the parties' Agreement. Thus, the Mariposa Franchisees brought 
this appeal because "the district court erred in dismissing the Complaint and compelling 
arbitration." (Brief of Appellant, 8, 10, 11-12, 15). 
Indeed, the district court's order of dismissal was improper under the Utah 
Uniform Arbitration Act. Although the court did not refer to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12 for the dismissal, that rule is the primary mechanism in this jurisdiction for 
dismissing claims in civil actions. Specifically, Rule 12 states that after a party files a 
complaint, the responding party shall file an answer or a motion to dismiss. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 12(a), (b). The USS Parties filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the 
case, relying on Miller Family Real Estate v. Hajizadeh, 2008 UT App 475, 200 P.3d 
213. (R. 167). But in Miller, this Court did not consider whether a district court may 
dismiss a complaint to compel arbitration under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. 
Instead, it considered whether the district court was justified in dismissing a complaint 
without prejudice where the agreement between the parties required them first to mediate 
their disputes. 2008 UT App 475, ffl[5, 15-16.5 
5
 USS cited to several federal cases in the district court to support its claim that the 
Complaint should be dismissed. (R. 167-68). However, the Federal Arbitration Act is 
different from the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. According to the federal act, in any 
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Under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, a district court is not at liberty to 
"dismiss" a properly served complaint even if all claims in the complaint are subject to 
arbitration. Utah Code §§ 78B-11-101, et seq. (the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act). 
Specifically, the plain language of section 78B-11-108 states that "[i]f a party makes a 
motion to the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial 
proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration" until final 
judgment is entered. Utah Code § 78B-11-108(6) (emphasis added). In addition, claims 
in a complaint that are not subject to arbitration may be severed from the arbitrable 
claims, and the court may limit the order staying the proceedings to the latter claims. Id. 
at §78B-11-108(7). 
If the legislature had intended dismissal to be a proper remedy in cases where all 
the claims in the complaint were arbitrable, it would not have included a separate and 
distinct severability provision or a provisions requiring that the district court stay the 
proceedings. Id; Turner v. Staker & Parson Co., 2012 UT 30, f 12, - P.3d - (court 
presumes the legislature used each word in a statute advisedly; it gives effect to every 
word and it avoids interpretations that render words superfluous). As a result, the plain 
language of the Act requires the district court to stay judicial proceedings if the claims 
are arbitrable (Utah Code § 78B-11-108(6)); to sever non-arbitrable claims from 
arbitrable claims when issuing the stay, (Id. at § 78B-11-108(7); and to proceed with non-
arbitrable claims in the case., Id In addition, the Act contemplates the involvement of 
the district court throughout the arbitration proceedings. See e^g., Utah Code § 78B-11-
109,-112. 
Therefore, given the plain and direct language of the Utah Uniform Arbitration 
Act, the district court's order of dismissal was in error. 
"suit or proceeding" for a claim that is subject to arbitration, the district court shall stay 
the trial of the action. 9 U.S.C.A. § 3. Federal law also allows a party to petition for 
13 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the district court's 
September 06, 2011, Order granting USS's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration be 
reversed and the case be remanded. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of July, 2012. 
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Karthik Nadesan 
Ivan LePendu 
Attorney for Appellants 
arbitration. Id. at § 4. Utah statutory law does not contain a similar provision. 
14 
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